Volume 86

Issue 4

Article 5

June 1984

The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State--A Response to
Professor Tushnet
Thomas Barton
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas Barton, The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State--A Response to Professor Tushnet, 86 W. Va.
L. Rev. (1984).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Barton: The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State--A Response to Profess

"THE CONSTITUTION OF THE BUREAUCRATIC
STATE"-A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR TUSHNET
THOMAS BARTON*

As social description and legal analysis Professor Tushnet displays in this article true insight.' The conceptual framework of politicized, rationalized, and professionalized bureaucracies is of great assistance in understanding many modern
Constitutional decisions. Tushnet's vision of the motives and sensibilities of
bureaucratic superiors is distressingly reminiscent of those portrayed in Joseph
Heller's Something Happened,2 and I fear it is accurate. The enumerated institutional and doctrinal incentives to rationalization and professionalization also undoubtedly exist. Indeed, additional incentives arise from the multitude and diversity of distributional decisions that must be made in a national welfare system.
As political agenda, however, the article is both less explicit and less convincing. Suppose that all is as Professor Tushnet describes. Suppose that bureaucratic
superiors allege, and courts believe, that welfare system administrative decisions
are far more rationally and professionally made than experience suggests is actually
the case; that such fictions serve to protect bureaucratic superiors and to control
bureaucratic subordinates; and that judicial acceptance of the fictions leads to the
creation of Constitutional doctrines that create incentives for the fictions to become
reality. Yet neither fictions nor their judicial acceptance are necessarily evil or even
undesirable. Indeed, Lon Fuller3 has described fictions as the theoretical waystations
of progressive legal thought. What then should compel advocacy for a repoliticized
bureaucracy?
The Tushnet agenda may or may not be compelled by concerns that current
decision-making is remote or disregarding of human dignity. Certainly the article
reveals an abiding interest in the well-being of welfare recipients. On the other hand,
Tushnet rejects proposals advanced by Professors Michelman and Mashaw that
attempt to respond to the degrading and impersonal methods by which welfare
decisions are made. Michelman and Mashaw suggest that by enhancing recipient
participation in the decision-making, welfare system "process values" can be made
more humane. However, neither the Michelman nor the Mashaw alternative is viewed
by Tushnet as accomplishing much beyond providing occasional "good feelings"
in recipients. He writes: "[T]he interest in winning will usually be overwhelmingly
larger than the interest in good feeling.... Thus the increment that the participatory
interest contributes to the [utilitarian] balance seems to me likely to be small."'
Indeed, Tushnet's opposition to the Michelman and Mashaw participatory alternatives exceeds mere skepticism about their effectiveness. First, he feels that enhanced
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, West Virginia University College
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' Tushnet, The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State, 86 W. VA. L. REv. 1077 (1984).
2 J. HELER, SoMETHING HAPPENED (1974).

L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967).
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participation may be counterproductiveto enhanced benefits receipt, and therefore
efforts at restructuring may not be worthwhile: "If more procedures are required,
less of those [welfare state] things will be done. And many of them serve
nonutilitarian ends. It is not obvious how one could properly resolve the conflict
between doing more nonutilitarian stuff and providing more nonutilitarian
procedures." ' s Second, and perhaps more importantly, he appears to dispute the
ethical foundation of the efforts to design more humane procedures: "[U]nder no
sensible moral theory is process in itself a value." 6 Therefore, his call for a repoliticized bureaucracy does not appear rooted in ethical or humanitarian objections
to the welfare system decisional process.
Nor, despite much suggestion to the contrary, is what compels the political
agenda that current bureaucratic decisions actually proceed from elitist and
sophmoric "professional" judgments, for that is the essence of the fiction: "On
the level of immediate experience we know that bureaucracies are shot through
with deskilled employees, that superiors make decisions based on personalities, that
beneath the surface of bureaucratic rules lies a dense network of personal associations that is what really let the bureaucracy operate."'
Nor, finally, is it necessarily that fewer deserving or needy individuals are provided with resources by reason of the existing system, as supplemented by Constitutional doctrine. On the contrary, the Goldberg v. Kelly creation of propertylike entitlements removable only through due procedures may well have added
substantial and needed protection to welfare recipients. Nowhere does Tushnet
disavow Goldberg. Rather, he states, "recipients of public assistance lack substantial political power and must call on the courts for aid in controlling the
bureaucracy." 8 Hence, until the realities of political power change, welfare recipients benefit from a rationalized or professionalized, rather than politicized,
bureaucracy.
Tushnet's argument contains, therefore, the following paradoxes: (a) out of
concern for welfare recipients, a system of bureaucratic decision-making is attacked
that enhances their benefits both absolutely, and relatively to the author's suggested
alternative system of distribution; and (b) the existing system is criticized for a
rationalization and professionalization that do not actually exist, but (because of
incentives created in the courts) that may increasingly come to exist the more the
system is attacked. The paradoxes can be neatly resolved through two theories,
both of which call for fundamental changes in our society. I cannot be certain
whether either theory is actually embraced by the call for a repoliticized bureaucracy.
On the other hand it is difficult to conceive alternative mechanisms by which more
politics translates into Tushnet's goal of recipient empowerment.
I Id. at 1116.
6Id.

7 Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1082.
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The first theory that could resolve the paradoxes is classic Marxism. According
to this theory, a system that incrementally improves the lot of the oppressed class
is to be avoided as an "enrichment of slaves" that stifles proletarian revolution.
Democracy offers only illusory, bourgeois freedoms that retain intact the class structure. Suggestions of this approach appear in Tushnet's text: "[Welfare state
bureaucracies] serve functions of social containment ....
" 9; and "Eliminating politics
from the [welfare recipient] branch may have the effect of diffusing potential threats
to political stability ....
".
, 0 ;and in a footnote, the suggestion is made that a major
reason for the existence of the welfare state is to buy sufficient domestic stability
to retain American "hegemony over the world capitalist economy."" If in this
article the vision of a repoliticized bureaucracy entails deliberate regression to a
corrupt, rascist, and arbitrary machine as a manipulative device to unite the rage
of welfare recipients in a revolutionary political accord, I reject the first move.
Moreover, I seriously doubt that Professor Tushnet has any such political agenda,
however much it may be inferable from some of the rhetoric.
The second theory by which the paradoxes of Tushnet's argument can be resolved leads to policies that offer far more appealing prospects: it deals with the
impact of "professionals" on social change and individual autonomy. This theory
is best known in the work of Ivan Illich, especially his Toward a History of Needs.'2
In the context of a national welfare system, Illich would attack the underlying
assumptions of a rationalized, professionalized bureaucracy: namely that social
redistribution is best accomplished by welfare institutions; that such institutions
should be staffed by professionals who "help people" by dispensing entitlements
or by making allocative decisions guided by expert judgment; that increased use
of the institution and its personnel would result in a more just society; and that
if the welfare system operates unfairly it must be made yet more rational and professional. The difficulty is not that professional judgment cannot exist or is prone
to inaccuracy; the problems are rather that the existence of professional judgment
tends to create institutions which become dependent on such judgment, and that
those institutions in turn create "needs" in people for whatever the institution provides. Certainly, as Tushnet states, many alleged professionals have become "deskilled" by their institutions. What perhaps is more serious is that those same persons
deskill others: professionals and their judgments impoverish and make passive and
ineffectual those who make use of them. The impoverishment of welfare recipients
can be quite literal, as they may be forced to relinquish personal assets and forego
opportunities at employment and self-development as conditions to their receipt
of welfare assistance. The impoverishment of the courts is more figurative. As
Tushnet explains, judges abdicate their powers and responsibilities of Constitutional
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1081 n.13.
I.ILLICH, TOWARD A HISTORY OF NEEDS (1980).
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interpretation at the feet of bureaucrats whenever professional norms are held to
be synonymous with substantive law.
It is conceivable, therefore, that when Tushnet argues for "repolitization" of
the bureaucracy, he is not so much arguing for a political class struggle as arguing
against abdication by both the courts and welfare recipients of their powers to
articulate and shape social welfare policy. This sort of "participation" differs from
that suggested by Michelman and Mashow. First, participation by recipients under
this repolitization theory does not substitute for or exclude the substantive involvement of the courts. As the article points out, "even old-fashioned [political]
13
bureaucracies must comply with the substantive provisions of the Constitution."
Second, the involvement of recipients would be as a community rather than individuals, and would proceed at the level of policy rather than particular allocative
decisions. The policies and procedures that would emerge from this sort of shift
from control by rules and professional norms to control by politics is not immediately
clear. Yet if what is advocated is a revitalized role for the courts as well as recipients, it is a policital agenda worth considering.

"STushnet,

supra note 1, at 1097.
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